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ABSTRACT

This paper addresses the educational implications of a unique Canadian program of refugee immigrant support and integration--private sponsorship. Individual Southeast Asian refugees and their families are financially supported by groups of five or more private individuals. Many such groups are affiliated with Christian church congregations. The workings of the program are briefly described, and it is argued that private sponsorship was not appreciably more effective than government sponsorship in addressing psychological needs, in introducing refugees to Canadian culture and economy, in developing cross-ethnic reference groups, or in orienting refugees toward formal Canadian education. Several studies are cited to support this argument, and structural weaknesses regarding the relationship between sponsors and refugees are examined. These include the nonprovision of effective tools to bridge cultural gulfs, the dependency of the refugee on the sponsor (producing a weak bond between them), an unclear role relationship making two-way reciprocity difficult, and a bias toward refugee women, viewed as peripheral to the process. This resulted in refugee-sponsor social and cultural conflict, deprivation of the refugees, and the subordination of female refugees. It is suggested that a refugee-centered anthropological approach would realize better results. The paper concludes with 33 references and a figure illustrating the factors affecting refugee-sponsor interaction. (WTH)

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Title: Some Educational Implications of the Canadian Private Sponsorship Program for Southeast Asian Refugees

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Refugees almost inevitably have unique educational needs—needs often not well addressed by normative, formal classroom education. This has been well illustrated by the host of educational difficulties experienced by refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea who have arrived in Canada and the United States since 1975. Whereas it is probable that, partially adapted as it was already to dealing with diverse immigrants, Canada's formal urban educational infrastructure was better able to address the challenge posed by Southeast Asians than was that of the United States, certain endemic difficulties have nevertheless arisen that have close parallels south of the border. These difficulties often stem from refugee psychological problems, from a comparative lack of prior experience with situations of formal learning or literacy, from a cultural lack of support for educational aspirations, and from feelings of powerlessness and normlessness (Dorais et al 1984).

This paper addresses the educational implications of a unique Canadian program of refugee immigrant support and integration--private sponsorship. Under this ongoing program individual refugees and refugee families are financially supported by groups of five or more private individuals; many such sponsorship groups are affiliated with Christian church congregations. At the time of the peak flow of Southeast Asians to Canada (1978-81) about half of all refugees were part of this program. I briefly describe the workings of this program and argue that until quite recently it was the predominant conviction of researchers, sponsors, government, and voluntary agency workers that the program had definite educational advantages over government sponsorship--advantages in quickly integrating individuals into the societal "rules of the game", in placing them in a

situation where they immediately had a dual (refugee and non-refugee), cross-cultural social reference group, and in instilling in them normative Canadian expectations of formal education (Canada. Employment and Immigration Commission 1981, 1982a). Indeed, in terms of the manifest agenda of many sponsors, private sponsorship was initially seen to be almost as centrally an educational process as it was a financial one--an educational experience made more responsive and effective than parallel formal government-supported programs by the supposed close, mutually responsive social relationships formed between sponsors and refugees.

I argue that in fact, current research suggests that private sponsorship was not appreciably more effective than government sponsorship in addressing refugee psychological needs, in introducing them to Canadian culture and economy, in developing cross-ethnic reference groups, or in orienting them towards formal Canadian education (Johnson & Beiser 1984). It is my main thesis that despite what seemed at the time to be obvious educational advantages of the private sponsorship program, certain structural constraints in refugee-sponsor relations made it unlikely that this potential was actually realized.

I. The Private Sponsorship Program

Although about 5-7,000 Vietnamese refugees arrived in Canada in 1975-6 as a consequence of the fall of the Thieu regime, as a large scale process the flow of Southeast Asian refugees into Canada dates from late 1978. Some 59,970 refugees and designated class immigrants arrived in Canada in 1979-80 (the equivalent of ten times that number arriving in the United States). Overall, about 85,000 individuals arrived from Vietnam, Kampuchea,

and Laos as refugees and designated class immigrants between 1975 and 1984. Including more recent refugee arrivals and those coming through normal immigration channels at least 120,000 people have come to Canada from these three countries since 1978 (all figures from Canada. Employment and Immigration 1985).

One of the key factors making this particular Canadian refugee flow different from those of the past was the private sponsorship program, which was only made possible by regulations arising in 1978 out of Canada's Immigration Act of 1976. These regulations allowed five or more Canadians (either citizens or landed immigrants) to sign a legal agreement with the federal government to be financially responsible for refugee individuals or families for a year or until they were financially self-supporting, whichever was shorter. For their part, government thereby allowed a refugee or family of refugees to immigrate who might not otherwise have been able to do so. Initially designed to be a rather small scale option in the overall Canadian immigration program catering to the interests of certain religious organizations, several factors resulted in private sponsorship becoming a major force in the resettlement of Southeast Asian refugees; one key factor was that during 1979-80 the government agreed that for every refugee that was privately sponsored in this fashion it would sponsor another refugee through its own system of government sponsorship and support, up to a limit of 29,000. At least 36,000 individuals were privately sponsored during 1979-81 (Canada. Employment and Immigration 1982a:7); current rates of private sponsorship worldwide are about 4,000 a year (Adelman 1987:8); about half of these are Southeast Asians (Canada. Employment and Immigration 1985:6). If these figures seem small, one should

again recall that Canada's population is one-tenth that of the United States; to make the American analogy, it would be as if groups of private individuals in the United States were to have sponsored the immigration of half a million people.

From the first, sponsorship groups supported and organized by church congregations or organizations predominated in private sponsorship; exact figures for this are a bit uncertain. The government considered 65% of the 6,887 sponsorship groups created between January 1, 1979 and December 31, 1980 to be operating under the aegis of one or another religious organization (Canada. Employment and Immigration 1982a:7). Various case studies have found rates in their samples ranging from 79% (Johnson and Beiser 198X: 9) to 57% (Neuwirth 1984:120). In this, the key players have been Roman Catholic congregations, groups organized through the Mennonite Central Committee, Christian Reformed congregations, and the United Church; together they supported 48% of all privately sponsored refugees during 1979-80 (Canada. Employment and Immigration 1982a:7). These same organizations now represent about the same percentage of private sponsorships (Canada. Employment and Immigration 1985:41).

II. The Apparent Educational Potential of Private Sponsorship

By all conventional wisdom, private sponsorship (as it was actually conceived of by sponsors initially) had far greater potential for the successful integration of Southeast Asian refugees into Canadian society than government sponsorship. After all, government sponsorship immediately dropped refugees into an alien culture where, without Canadian relevant others as guides, they had to largely fend for themselves. Government

financial support was available, but it was administered bureaucratically, and with good reason it was anticipated that bureaucratically-bound social welfare delivery systems were going to be unable to flexibly reform their charters to deal with these new clients' needs; this indeed led to a wide variety of cross-cultural difficulties which were never successfully resolved (See Indra 1987). Government support for English or French Second Language training was erratic and episodic, and usually constituted formal, classroom training that was rarely significantly adjusted to refugees' prior experience and needs. Beyond cultural and linguistic barriers to formal learning, some refugees had little prior experience with literacy or formal education itself. Many operated in an oral cultural mode rather than a literate one. In any case, the government made few efforts to use formal educational techniques to teach these new Canadians about Canada.[1] Neither did government develop any special programs to stream adult refugees into the educational system for retraining or upgrading.[2]

Indeed, if like Le (1986) we consider that education must be seen as far more than just what goes on in classrooms, the wide range of initial disabilities faced by Southeast Asian refugees would suggest that for them to come to a successful, functional understanding of Canadian society and their place in it, a more personal, person-specific, psychologically-supported strategy of integration than that provided by government sponsorship would be far more effective. After all, refugees arrived in Canada in a very high state of dependency and disorientation. Disorientation began in the turbulent, often violent events in their home countries which led them to flee. Such disorientation was compounded in the process of flight and in the often temporary extended liminality of the

refugee camps. In the case of refugees designated to come to Canada virtually no a priori instruction about Canada had been arranged.[3] Save for a small elite stratum, most had a limited exposure to western culture and many had few class resources. From an educational point of view (again taking education in a general sense) adults were in such a liminal state, wherein status, key personal values, life chances, ability to control one's situation were all in transition, that they were in effect going through what might be termed "adult enculturation and re-socialization."

Although rarely framed in an education metaphor, from the start such considerations were clearly evident concerning the relative advantages of private sponsorship. In contrast to the narrow, financially-oriented government requirements of private sponsorship, both sponsors and those guiding sponsors stressed that it was to be a process concerned with far more than simply the financial support of refugees. As in almost all other recent public issues concerning refugees (as for example in the case of Ethiopians and Eritrians), Southeast Asian refugees had become became an important Canadian social issue on the basis of a highly psychological, individual-centered image of "the refugee" and his or her plight; this public image constantly stressed the personal trials and tribulations of refugees: the death of family members, the Boat People saga, etc. In so doing, it more or less set the agenda for private sponsorship: private sponsorship was ideally to provide constant personal support to these "psychologically wounded" individuals by caring Canadians who would be able to flexibly respond to their individual needs.

In basic practice this ideology was actually implemented to a considerable degree. Sponsorship groups typically pre-arranged places for refugees to

stay--often initially with sponsors themselves, then usually an apartment nearby. They usually pre-stocked such apartments with furniture and food. They met refugees as soon as they arrived in the local region and thereafter frequently spent a great deal of time with them: talking about the refugee experience, informally instructing refugees about the basic necessities of life in Canada, bringing them physically to such places as grocery stores and the like, seeing to their health needs, arranging for their children to go to school, and often finding them their first jobs. Most sponsorship groups made a point of making sure that at least one member of their group visited or had some other kind of activity with their sponsored refugee every day during the initial months of resettlement. This kind of constant contact and guidance was virtually absent from the experience of most government sponsored refugees.

Of those two-thirds of sponsorship groups that were connected with religious organizations, some also made attempts to integrate refugees with their church community; this typically involved bringing them to church services and other church events, visiting other church members in their homes, and introducing refugees to other refugees sponsored by other members of the same congregations. Many attempted the conversion of refugees sponsored by members of their congregations.[4] Local churches who were especially active in refugee sponsorship sometimes went further, and established formal cultural orientation classes for refugees and ESL programs.[5]

III. Did Private Sponsorship Actually Achieve It Potential?

In retrospect, the Canadian situation during 1979-81 thus offers a

controlled experiment in two forms of refugee sponsorship: people in high states of dependency and need coming from family- and community-based, essentially oral, Asian cultures interfacing either with a highly centralized, bureaucratic/"Gesselschaft" approach to refugee settlement or with a localized, small-scale, informal/"Gemeinschaft" strategy represented by private sponsorship.

Largely on the basis of a priori "common sense", theoretical considerations, or the direct observation of the initial phases of settlement, there was initially nearly universal consensus (Kaplan 1980:16; Buchignani 1980 are representative), everything being equal (and in due regard to the obviously variable nature of both settlement options), private sponsorship was likely to produce superior results: better psychological health and personal grounding, more instrumental capability to "work the system", quicker economic integration, more social support reflected in a larger circle of inter-ethnic friends and acquaintances, a greater degree of functional acculturation and integration, a stronger orientation towards re-training and education, etc.[6] In a somewhat more qualified fashion this is what I myself had predicted on the basis of my own extensive first hand experience with refugee settlement as the director of a large Canadian non-governmental immigrant settlement agency during 1978-81.

And indeed, as initial formal research began coming in concerning private sponsorship one found these a priori expectations largely confirmed (Canada. Employment and Immigration 1982b:11; Breems/Dpa Consulting 1982; Samuel 1987:13; Fuhr 1981:61; McCrossman 1980:15-16; Adelman 1982:101).

In contrast, more recent studies (including a few relatively large scale quantitative ones) do not appear to well support these initial observations. For example, a large scale survey of Vancouver refugees (n = 1,348) showed no significant difference in the effectiveness of most forms of assistance received by private and governmentally sponsored refugees (Johnson and Beiser 198-); private sponsors had a small but significant advantage in financial assistance and in finding their first jobs, and they had a marginally better understanding of certain Canadian financial institutions. In their admittedly limited set of objective measures of resettlement the authors of this study found no difference between the two groups regarding employment status, English fluency, or knowledge of Canadian society.

In another, related study, Beiser (1984:77) found that form of sponsorship had no effect on refugee morale; he hypothesized that psychological conflict engendered by the difference between church-based sponsors' religion and Southeast Asian ones countered any positive effects arising from the closer personal relations engendered by private sponsorship. Woon (1987) recently claimed that sponsors in her small Victoria sample are frequently seen by refugees as paternalistic. She also presents some evidence that such refugees were afterwards somewhat more dependent than those who were not privately sponsored. Deschamp's (1982) Quebec Government study showed no difference in the job participation rate of privately and governmentally sponsored refugees, even though a a national survey showed that privately sponsored refugees entered the workforce more quickly (Canada. Employment and Immigration 1982), and everywhere privately sponsored refugees seemed to have had significant help from their sponsors

in finding their first jobs (Samuel 1987).

Now most of this recent spate of studies can certainly be faulted for a particular kind of lack of sophistication: none save for Woon really seek to look at sponsorship from the refugee point of view; they are based on survey research, which imposes an external grid on the refugee experience which certainly allows many nuances to escape.[7] In this regard, I am sure that more anthropological research strategies will eventually show some rather clear differences between at least the perceptions of privately sponsored and governmentally sponsored refugees.[8]

At the same time, it would be impossible to argue on the basis of present evidence that there are any gross adaptive differences between these two categories of refugees. In essence, the initial set of learning hypotheses developed to contrast these two forms of sponsorship have not been well supported.

IV. Structural Difficulties Restricting the Potential of Private Sponsorship as an Educational Vehicle

The primary issue then becomes why: why should we see this unpredicted result? The indications of why are beginning to arise--and they are indications which seem to have significant implications for the more general incorporation of minorities into national systems. In order to better articulate these forces let me first propose a general model of the central structural tensions evident in private sponsorship which seem to mitigate against its fulfilling its full abstract potential. In conclusion I will then address these indications in point form, with a short discussion following each.

A. A Model of Structural Tensions in Private Sponsorship

Of necessity, any unilineal model of social process is a parody of reality, and this one is no exception. Rather than reflecting reality, I suggest that the following diagram constitutes at least a structured set of factors that in one fashion or another limit the potentially multiplex possibilities of private sponsorship. As such, it is not suggested to be an overall model of private sponsorship nor a general comment on its overall effectiveness.

[Insert Figure 1 here]

B. A priori Factors Limiting the Potential of Refugee-Sponsor Relations

It would be my contention that the most significant impediments to the development of private sponsorship relations were structural constraints that arose in the initial formulation of such relations--particularly those which limited the consequent depth of relations between sponsors and refugees. This seems a reasonable conclusion based on several evident points. First, it is clear that weaknesses in refugee-sponsor relations were at the heart of this arrangement not maximizing its potential and that these weaknesses did not typically stem from any lack of effort or attention on the part of either sponsors or refugees (Neuwirth 1984). As mentioned, it was an overt objective of sponsors to befriend refugees and to help sooth their psychological difficulties through inter-personal support and caring, and most groups spent a great deal of time and effort in trying to reach these objectives (Fuhr 1981; Kehler 1980). My own

experience with hundreds of sponsored refugees as well as reports in the literature make me convinced that the great majority of refugees also wanted to make the best of this relationship. For most refugees, links with sponsors were initially their only personal tie with Canada and Canadians, and however they viewed the sponsorship arrangement there was certainly no lack of appreciation of it on their part.

The unambiguous conclusion that one must make is that something was structurally weak about the actual relationship formed between sponsors and refugees. Through taking a basic social interactionist perspective, the a priori conditions which set constraints on these relationships are comparatively clear. First, the system did not provide either refugees or sponsors with effective tools to bridge the significant cultural and experiential gulf between them (Neuwirth 1984). Given the acuteness of the situation, it would obviously have been impossible for either set of parties to have been provided with very much of a cultural introduction to the other, but some sort of basic cultural introduction could have been provided to refugees before their sponsorship began; none was provided. Neither were there formal means in place thereafter for bicultural individuals to easily broker the cultural gap between refugees and sponsors. One consequence was often that sponsors and refugees had to find connections at the absolutely most general level: that of having a mutual respect and empathy for each other based on the common ground of both being human. Another consequence was that throughout the ongoing relationship each party's values, beliefs, and perceptions were to be largely insulated from the other's, no matter how convinced each was that they truly understood the other (Woon 1987).

Second, it was inevitable that there would be a relative monopoly of sponsor power, privilege and knowledge, as compared with sponsored refugees. This had the potential to weaken bonds between refugees and sponsors, because it put refugees in a state of structural dependency.

Third, refugees and sponsors were thrown together without any clear guidance as to what their respective roles were to be. Here, I do not refer to the technical end of the relationship: obviously, sponsors knew what their responsibilities were, and, to a very limited extent, refugees knew what they could count on by way of support. Instead I refer to roles in the social science sense: neither knew clearly what role they were to play, nor did either have the cross-cultural sophistication necessary to understand the role presentation of the other. Mutually rewarding role relations are always difficult to achieve when (as in this case) there are great differentials in power, privilege, and prestige between the parties; cross culturally, such successful relations are typically based on some form of reciprocal (if obviously asymmetrical) contract between the parties involved--as in patron-client relations found throughout the traditional world, or as in contractual employer-employee relations in North America. The need for such clear role relations is critical to anyone in a state of psychological and social disorganization, especially someone from a quasi-traditional society where role relations are far more definitive and clear than here.

And yet no mechanism was provided as part of the private sponsorship option to develop such a contract between refugees and sponsors when the relationship was begun. Appreciating that if they were in such a state of dependence they themselves would not like it, some sponsor groups did

attempt to make something of a contract between themselves and refugees, but again, these attempts usually centered on rather technical matters of who provided or did what, as opposed to the actual role relations. Indeed, it seems clear now that a great many privately sponsored refugees remained very unclear as to what sponsors' roles were (see Woon 1987)--even about why sponsors were providing them with assistance in the first place. Neither were there any means developed for there to be effective two-way reciprocity between sponsors and refugees--something that is clearly critical to a successful role interaction.

Finally, refugee women (save for when they were single privately sponsored refugees) were made peripheral to the whole process by the systemic biases of government, sponsorship groups and others (Woon 198-). Male refugees were inevitably seen as the heads of households, were often the one's spoken to concerning important decisions, were the ones first sent out to work. Beyond the evident neglect of women itself, this led to a systematic inability of the sponsor-refugee relation to build on the integrative social strengths of women refugees.

C. Some Consequences for Sponsor-Refugee Relations and for the Use of Sponsorship as an Educative and Supportive Medium

The central overall consequence was that, lacking grounding in a clear social contract, refugee-sponsor relations tended to remain weak and few-dimensioned irrespective of how much effort was put into making them strong and multiplex. Some of the key, more significant consequences can be placed under three basic headings.

1. Refugee-sponsor social and cultural ambiguity and conflict

From the point of view of refugees their relationship between themselves and their sponsors commonly produced a great deal of tension between what may be termed refugee familialism and sponsors' social demands. All Southeast Asian cultures are highly familial, in the sense that the family is the primary reference group. Lacking a clear understanding of their relations with sponsors, refugees (especially men) often saw a contradiction between their familial role and the role they were playing in relation to sponsors. Sponsors were intimately involved with things which traditionally were strictly family matters, and yet were not family members.[9].

This tension was exacerbated by what refugees often saw as sponsorship paternalism in the context of their own objective dependence (see Woon 1987:5, 13; Neuwirth 1984:123). Again, I would stress that this was not just a result of the (largely inevitable) disparity in power and privilege between refugees and sponsors, It derived also from a lack of a clear set of patron-client roles to contextualize that power differential. As a consequence, refugees often felt that they were treated like children and that they were often required to do things which they did not want to do or did not understand.

Naturally, both the weak role reciprocity and the large cultural gap between sponsors and refugees resulted in refugees and sponsors operating largely within their own culture-specific spheres of value throughout the relationship--even though it was sometimes not clear that this was in fact happening. Despite the great and well-intended efforts of sponsors to be considerate of refugees and to understand things from their point of view,

refugees often felt that sponsors fell short on "cultural empathy" (Beiser 1984; Neuwirth 1984:124). Traditional refugee role etiquette and a lack of English or French language linguistic proficiency constrained refugees' abilities to make these conflicts known and their largely remained unresolved.

Finally, I believe that sponsor-refugee relations were also marked by a communications barrier thrown up by what can be best termed the difference between an oral and a literate cultural orientation and between their respective modes of instruction. Save for that relatively small sub-group who were highly educated, most refugees had lived in a primarily oral culture: one marked by oral discourse being the primary instrument of communication and of the transmission of culture. Instruction (or education, if you will) in such places is typically carried out through observation and through trial and error, as moderated by ongoing oral discourse. The forms of formal instruction so typical of our society are much less significant. And yet, this was the primary method by which most cultural and social instruction of refugees was carried out by sponsors. Refugees were told how to do things in a linear, text-based fashion unfamiliar to them; they were shown how to do things rather than being allowed to do things; they were told about things without being able to observe or comment on them. It is consequently not surprising that the depths of cultural knowledge achieved by privately sponsored refugees was not more than it was.

2. Refugee relative deprivation

One critical result was that, comparatively uncertain of the status of

themselves, sponsors, and others, refugees frequently became relatively deprived--both in comparison with other privately sponsored refugees and as compared with government sponsored refugees (Woon 1987:5,12; Neuwirth 1984:122). It was commonly their perception that other privately sponsored refugees were being given more privileges than they--and, not being clear about either their rights and responsibilities or those of their sponsors, were resentful of it. They were also sometimes envious of the relative social freedom of government-sponsored refugees, who were dependent on (abstract) government rather than any particular person. This of course further compounded the overall ambiguity of sponsor-refugee relations.

3. Female Subordination and de-significance

In some ways women seemed better able to psychologically weather the many trials and tribulations of being a refugee in a foreign country and culture; this was clearly the case in regard to the comparative self-concepts of women and men that I found in a recent study (Indra 198-). It would seem that men's roles as household providers and spokespersons, and their responsibilities in turn to their families of origin played heavily on them; naturally, coming from societies were men dominated public roles, men were thereafter more vulnerable to the psychological effects of being marginal and objectively powerless.

Obviously, this should have led to some sort of systematic attempt to help men with these gender-linked psychological problems, though nothing like this was forthcoming. Perhaps more to the issue here, the overall sexist nature of the private sponsorship context led to the comparative inability

of the participants to build a better grounding for both self, family and sponsor-refugee relationship on the comparative strengths of women. Indeed, as a rule women faced a double delegitimation (given that they were here with family): delegitimation as women within their own households, and a similar delegitimation in refugee-sponsor relations.

D. Conclusion

I believe that it is increasingly realized that informal educational experiences can be a vital part of the process of grounding culturally different migrants into their new milieu. Moreover, the extensive literature on education and development clearly stresses that such informal techniques are particularly important in the context of primarily oral cultures, and there is no reason to expect that this would not also hold true for immigrants in North America.

In this regard, Canada's private sponsorship strategy clearly has a number of the necessary ingredients to establish a a potentially vital means of bridging two divergent cultural and learning styles. However necessary, these ingredients evidently did not prove sufficient to the task. Some of the reasons (now arising) might have been anticipated. Others, now more clear in retrospect, could no doubt have been derived from taking a concerted look at the refugee situation from the <u>refugee</u> point of view. This is turn is a powerful argument for the value of a refugee-centered anthropological approach look at this sponsor-refugee interface.

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Notes

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1. The key exception ere limited term orientation classes put on in a number of Canadian cities by government-funded helping organizations.

2. Though, it must be stressed, many went through already extant ones.

3. The most clear exceptions were the two person program of the Mennonite Central Committee and the one person effort of the Quebec government in Phanat Nikom refugee camp in Thailand.

4. Excepting the many Vietnamese were Catholic, almost no refugees were practicing Christians before their arrival.

5. See Neuwirth (1984:122) for a rather extensive discussion of these sponsorship group activities.

6. Johnson and Beiser 198-:30 considers three basic dimensions of sponsorship assistance: instrumental support, social support, and an orienting function. Superior results were expected from private sponsorship in all three domains.

7. One of the above studies uses the question of whether refugees celebrate Thanksgiving as a measure of knowledge of Canadian culture.

8. See Harrell-Bond 1986:392 for the need to inform survey construction with materials drawn from qualitative research.

9. See Indra 198-

A PRIORI FACTORS CONSTRAINING THE POSSIBILITIES OF REFUGEE-SPONSOR INTERACTION:

MUTUAL (SPONSOR AND REFUGEE) LACK OF CROSS-CULTURAL AWARENESS AND OF CROSS-CULTURAL BRIDGING MECHANISMS
(Consequences: attempts to build social relations on the basis of 'empathy' and culturally constrained ideas of human nature; little cross-cultural understanding and little sense of how to achieve it)

A RELATIVE MONOPOLY OF SPONSOR POWER, PRIVILEGE AND KNOWLEDGE, AS COMPARED WITH SPONSORED REFUGEES
(Consequence: the structural dependency of refugees on their sponsors)

LACK OF PRIOR ROLES OR ROLE MODELS APPROPRIATE FOR THE SPONSOR-REFUGEE RELATION; LACK OF APPROPRIATE MECHANISMS TO PROVIDE SUCH ROLES WHEN NEEDED
(Consequence: continual sponsor-refugee role ambiguity and mutual lack of understand of other's role)

SPONSOR, REFUGEE, AND GOVERNMENT SEXISM
(Consequences: men are seen as the central refugees; refugee women are consistently subordinated and have their concerns delegitimated in both sponsorship schemes)

THESE FACTORS CONTRIBUTE TO THE CENTRAL REFUGEE-SPONSOR TENSION:

LACK OF A CLEAR SOCIAL CONTRACT BETWEEN REFUGEES AND SPONSORS; LITTLE EFFECTIVE ROLE RECIPROCITY

CONSEQUENT PRIMARY EFFECTS OF THIS TENSION:

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL AMBIGUITY AND CONFLICT	REFUGEE RELATIVE DEPRIVATION	FEMALE SUBORDINATION
(manifest in:)	(manifest in:)	(manifest in)
Tension between refugee familialism and sponsor social demands	Refugee uncertainty about rights and responsibilities	Refuge-sponsor links primarily male-to-male
Tension arising from	Refugee comparisons with the situations of other	Relevant refugee

paternalism and dependency in the context of an incomplete basis for patron-client relations

Unbrokered value conflict

Tension between oral and literate culture modes

privately sponsored refugees

Refugee comparisons with the situations of government sponsored refugees

needs seen are primarily male

Integrative strengths of women neglected

Figure 1. Factors influencing sponsor-refugee relations